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The Impression of Possible Bias: What a





Contractual arbitration' is a popular alternative to commercial
litigation 2 because it allows parties to resolve their disputes in an ex-
trajudicial setting;3 parties agree to forego the judicial process in favor
of immediate resolution of their conflict in an impartial hearing. Ar-
* J.D. Candidate, 1994; B.A. 1991, Middlebury College. I would like to thank Mom,
Dad, and all my friends and family.
1. Contractual arbitration refers to the process by which contracting parties agree to
"voluntarily submit their disputes for resolution by one or more impartial third persons
instead of by a judicial tribunal." H. WARREN KNioHT E AL., CALIFORNrA PRAcncE
GuIDE: ALTERNATrvE DisPUTE RESOLUTrON 4:6 (1992). Contractual. arbitration differs
markedly from "judicial arbitration." See id. 4:7. Judicial arbitration is a term for certain
actions that are statutorily diverted to arbitration before trial (like superior court actions in
which the amount in controversy is $50,000 or less). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.11
(West Supp. 1993); see KNIGH-T ET AL., supra, 4:7. In these judicial arbitrations, there is
no preexisting agreement to arbitrate. Id. Furthermore, judicial arbitration awards are
nonbinding on the parties and either party may demand a trial de novo by judge or jury.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.2 (West Supp. 1993); see KNIGHT ET AL., supra, 4:7. While
parties are free to choose either binding or nonbinding contractual arbitration, this Note
focuses on binding contractual arbitration. Unless otherwise indicated, "arbitration" refers
solely to binding contractual arbitration before one or more neutral arbitrators.
2. The number of arbitrations presided over by American Arbitration Association
(AAA) arbitrators demonstrates, in part, the contemporary prevalence of arbitration as a
means of private dispute resolution. In 1980, AAA arbitrators presided over 40,694 arbi-
trations. In 1985, AAA arbitrators presided over 45,141 arbitrations, 7,937 of which were
commercial arbitrations. In 1990, AAA arbitrators presided over 60,808 arbitrations,
13,603 of which were commercial arbitrations. In 1992, AAA arbitrators presided over
59,156 arbitrations, 12,858 of which were commercial arbitrations. Telephone Interview
with Barbara Brady, American Arbitration Association (Nov. 16, 1993).
3. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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bitration awards4 differ significantly from court-rendered judgments
in that they receive only limited post-determination judicial review.
5
This review is limited to examining possible defects in the arbitration
process, and does not address the arbitrator's substantive decision.
6
One defect that would justify vacation of an arbitrator's award is man-
ifest bias on the part of a supposedly neutral arbitrator.7 Manifest
bias taints an award because the aggrieved party does not receive the
minimum levels of integrity granted to parties who choose to have
their disputes resolved by a neutral arbitrator.8
In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.,9
the United States Supreme Court held that the failure of a neutral
arbitrator to disclose a relationship that gives rise to an impression of
possible bias justifies vacation of an arbitration award. 10 The policy
4. Arbitration awards are the functional equivalent of judgments rendered in a court
of law, in the sense that both allow for principled dispute resolution between two parties.
See RICHARD CHERNICK, ADR FOR THE COMMERCIAL LITIGATOR 47 (1989).
5. BERTHOLD HOENIGER, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION HANDBOOK § 1.06 (1990).
6. An arbitrator's substantive decision is defined here as an exercise of the power to
resolve the entire merits of a controversy submitted by the parties. See Moncharsh v. Heily
& Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 900 (Cal. 1992). In California, the general rule is that an arbitrator's
decision cannot be reviewed for errors of fact or law, even when such error appears on the
face of the award and causes substantial injustice to the parties. Id. at 919; see ROBERT
COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 30 (3d ed. rev. 1987).
Coulson notes that state statutes generally limit a court's authority to review awards.
Id. An arbitration award will be vacated only if the arbitrator engaged in misconduct, the
arbitrators exceeded their statutory authority, or the arbitration hearing did not comport
with due process. Id.
7. See COULSON, supra note 6, at 30.
8. It might seem self-evident that neutral arbitrators should be impartial, but no Cal-
ifornia case has explicitly stated that the presence of a neutral arbitrator demands that the
neutral arbitrator act in an impartial manner. However, grounds to vacate an arbitration
award would exist if a neutral arbitrator acted in a partial manner. As the California
Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he Legislature has determined that the parties shall have considerable leeway
in structuring the dispute settlement arrangements by which they are bound;
while recognizing that this leeway may permit the establishment of arrangements
which vary to some extent from the dead-center of neutrality, we at the same time
must insist ... that certain 'minimum levels of integrity' be achieved if the ar-
rangement is to pass judicial muster.
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 176 (Cal. 1981). An arrangement providing for
dispute resolution before one or more neutral arbitrators provides the requisite minimum
levels of integrity because it ensures an award from a neutral decision maker similar to that
which would have been obtained had the parties litigated their dispute. However, such
integrity would be absent in a case where a neutral arbitrator acted in a partial manner. In
such a case, the neutral arbitrator would be acting contrary to the agreement between the
parties. If courts were to give effect to an award procured under these circumstances, the
actions of the "neutral" arbitrator surely would not meet the "minimum levels of integrity"
required under California law.
9. 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
10. Id. at 149.
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basis for this ruling was sound: to ensure that those parties who opt
out of the judicial system enjoy the same safeguard as those who
choose to litigate.1'
This "impression of possible bias" test seems like it would be an
easy standard to meet. Because arbitrators know about their previous
relationships, they should have no problem identifying and disclosing
those that create an impression of possible bias. However, while ad-
herence to this standard appears easy in the abstract, its practical ap-
plication is difficult. The Commonwealth Coatings standard creates
significant and difficult questions for arbitrators: What types of rela-
tionships create an impression of possible bias? Are they limited to
business relationships, or do they include social relationships? What,
for that matter, constitutes a business relationship?
These questions assume greater importance in connection with
judicial recognition of arbitration awards. After an arbitration hear-
ing, the arbitrator renders an award favoring one party over the
other.12 The arbitration proceedings at this point are not subject to
court review except under two situations.' 3 First, if the losing party
11. Id. at 148; see also id. at 150 ("This rule of arbitration and [the 33d Canon of
Judicial Ethics] rest on the premise that any tribunal permitted by law to try cases and
controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of
bias.").
While the judicial and arbitration systems share this common safeguard, different con-
siderations apply to arbitrators than to judges. Justice Byron White noted this difference in
his concurrence when he stated:
The Court does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held to the standards
of judicial decorum of Article III judges, or indeed of any judges. It is often
because they are men of affairs, not apart from but of the market place, that they
are effective in their adjudicatory function. This does not mean that the judiciary
must overlook outright chicanery in giving effect to their awards; this would be an
abdication of our responsibility. But it does mean that arbitrators are not auto-
matically disqualified by a business relationship with the parties before them if
both parties are informed of the relationship in advance, or if they are unaware of
the facts but the relationship is trivial. I see no reason automatically to disqualify
the best informed and most capable arbitrators.
Id. at 150 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Justice White's commentary is important because it recognizes more than just the dif-
ferent considerations that apply to judges and arbitrators. It recognizes that parties are
free to disregard previous relationships that give rise to an impression of possible bias if
they are informed of these relationships in advance. This recognition gives rise to an im-
portant corollary, one founded on the consensual nature of contractual arbitration. See
infra note 25. If parties are confronted with an arbitrator whose previous relationships
give rise to an impression of possible bias, they may either disregard the previous relation-
ships and appoint the arbitrator, or refuse to appoint the arbitrator, opting instead for the
appointment of one satisfactory to both parties.
12. CotLsoN, supra note 6, at 28.
13. This is because "[a]n arbitrator's award is not directly enforceable. Until con-
firmed or vacated by court proceedings, the award has no more force or effect than a
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does not comply with the terms of the award, then the winning party
may seek enforcement of the award in court.14 Second, the losing
party may go to court if grounds exist to vacate the award, such as the
failure to disclose a relationship that gives rise to an impression of
possible bias.1
5
This limited access to judicial review is problematic because a
court of law is the sole forum that can provide authoritative answers
to the questions raised above. An arbitrator's answers to these ques-
tions are merely speculative, and show only what the arbitrator per-
sonally felt was necessary to disclose. However, judicial
determination of these questions is final. If a judge thinks an undis-
closed relationship creates an impression of possible bias, then the
judge will vacate the award. Essentially, the judiciary maintains the
power to second-guess an arbitrator's judgment. Thus, arbitrators
have only the phrase "impression of possible bias" as a guide to dis-
closure. The phrase itself offers little practical assistance; it is an
amorphous guide whose contours are developed by judges in a post
hoc determination of what an arbitrator should have disclosed.
Two principal reasons necessitate clarification of the impression
of possible bias standard. First, clarification is necessary to maintain
the viability of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolu-
tion.' 6 If the standard is unclear, then parties will be tempted to seek
vacation of unfavorable arbitration awards in every instance by at-
tempting to capitalize on a vague and inherently manipulable stan-
dard. If losing parties routinely turn to the judiciary to avoid
unfavorable arbitration awards in this manner, then arbitration will be
little more than a pit stop before the parties' eventual invocation of
the judicial process. Second, a clear standard is necessary for the con-
tinued vitality of the arbitration system. If the standard is imprecise,
uncertainty will creep into the process. This instability will, in turn,
delegitimize arbitration because people will be unwilling to opt into a
system of alternative dispute resolution that cannot guarantee consis-
tent results. 17
contract in writing between the parties to the arbitration." KNIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, [
4:443.
14. COULSON, supra note 6, at 29.
15. Id. at 30.
16. See infra note 25.
17. An arbitrator's civil liability is generally not at issue when an award is vacated for
failure to disclose a relationship that gave rise to an impression of possible bias, because
California grants arbitrators immunity from civil liability when acting in the capacity of
arbitrator under any statute or contract. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1993).
However, this does not foreclose the possibility of civil litigation altogether. A strik-
ing example of this is Neaman v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992), discussed infra notes 129-134 and accompanying text. In Neaman, an award favor-
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This Note examines the impression of possible bias standard as it
has evolved in California, and applies it to institutional arbitration
providers. Part I discusses arbitration as a means of alternative dis-
pute resolution, characteristic features of the arbitration process, and
the need for neutral arbitrators. Part II discusses the legal framework
governing the impression of possible bias, covering the seminal Com-
monwealth Coatings case and its adoption in California. Part III
traces the evolution of the standard in the California courts of appeal
and normatively assesses current law. Part IV addresses application
of the standard to two of the nation's largest providers of arbitration
services. Given the great number of disputes settled through arbitra-
tion proceedings, 18 this issue is of great importance. As the business
ties of arbitrators extend to wider circles, the pool of relations that
may create an impression of possible bias also increases. While Cali-
fornia courts have not tested the impression of possible bias standard
as applied to large arbitration providers, this Note addresses how the
standard should be applied.
I. Arbitration as a Means of Alternative Dispute Resolution
Arbitration 9 is the functional equivalent of litigation in the sense
that it allows parties to create binding settlements of disputes, albeit
outside the judicial forum. While differing in form, arbitration shares
certain characteristics with litigation. Perhaps the most important
similarity is that both feature an impartial decision maker.
Arbitration offers several advantages over the judicial system as a
means of dispute resolution in this impartial setting. Arbitration gen-
ing Kaiser was vacated because the neutral arbitrator failed to disclose a substantial busi-
ness relationship with Kaiser. Id at 880. The neutral arbitrator, Ralph Drummond, was
not sued for this nondisclosure. However, he was later sued in a similar situation. See
Evans v. Drummond, No. BC 067119 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 26, 1992). In Evans, Evans
submitted to arbitration an unrelated claim against Kaiser in which Drummond also served
as the neutral arbitrator. Drummond rendered an award favoring Kaiser. Unsatisfied with
the award, Evans sued Drummond and Kaiser on various fraud theories. The one most
relevant to this Note was her claim of constructive fraud. She alleged constructive fraud on
the basis that Drummond fraudulently stood to gain by neglecting to disclose his substan-
tial business relationship with Kaiser. Evans claimed that she never would have agreed to
Drummond as the chosen neutral arbitrator had she known of this relationship.
This allegation of fraud would not overcome the statutory grant of immunity because
the proper remedy for arbitrator misconduct is the vacation of an award rendered by the
arbitrator. Coopers & Lybrand v. Superior Court, 260 Cal. Rptr. 713, 721 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989). However, this complaint demonstrates that failure to disclose relationships that give
rise to an appearance of possible bias may force neutral arbitrators into unwanted
litigation.
18. See supra note 2.
19. See supra note 1.
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erally resolves commercial disputes at a lower cost than litigation.20 It
also tends to settle disputes more quickly and efficiently than litiga-
tion does. Parties in large commercial disputes need not wait years for
courtroom access, nor wade through extensive pretrial discovery and
motion practice.2' Arbitration hearings and decisions are not matters
of public record and may be kept confidential.22 Furthermore, parties
generally do not sacrifice decision-making quality when they submit
claims to arbitration because arbitrators are typically retired judges,
practicing lawyers, or experts in the field in which the dispute arises.23
Arbitration is a consensual arrangement,2 4 with its terms dictated
by contract between the parties.25 The two methods that predominate
are "single" and "tripartite" arbitration.26 In single arbitration, the
20. HOENIGER, supra note 5, § 1.02 ("Although no nationwide statistics are available,
several major 'consumers' of dispute resolution have done comparative cost studies, and
arbitration and other ADR methods have come out as clear winners. Thus, one major
insurance carrier reported that it saved over $500,000 by submitting 450 claims for
ADR."); Bruce Fein, Keeping Customers Out of the Courts, LEGAL TIMEs, Sept. 28, 1992,
at 24 ("[An uncomplicated personal injury court trial may consume two weeks and cost
$1,000,000, whereas an ADR procedure addressing the identical claim might be completed
in less than a day for approximately $1,200.").
21. CHERNICK, supra note 4, at 48.
22. Id.
23. CoULSoN, supra note 6, at 9; HOENIGER, supra note 5, § 4.13.
24. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
25. The function of courts in civil litigation is to resolve disputes between parties.
Concomitant to this function is the right to make use of the courts as a means to settle
disputes. In contractual arbitration, parties agree ahead of time to forego this right in the
event that a future dispute should arise. See supra note 1.
That this agreement to bypass the judicial process arises from a contractual relation-
ship is significant. Through their freedom to contract, parties select for themselves the
method by which future disputes are to be decided. Although this Note focuses on arbitra-
tion before one or more neutral arbitrators, see supra note 1 , nothing prevents the parties
themselves from selecting a method of arbitration that does not feature neutral arbitrators.
See supra note 8; see also Graham v. Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d 165, 174 (Cal. 1981). Once the
parties do choose to arbitrate before one or more neutral arbitrators, however, those arbi-
trators must truly be impartial, see supra note 8, and they must disclose any previous rela-
tionships that give rise to an impression of possible bias.
Just as parties are free to choose the method by which their disputes will be arbitrated,
they may select the method for choosing their arbitrators. On this point, see CouLSON,
supra note 6, at 14 ("Commercial arbitrators serve under the rules selected by the par-
ties."); see also CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.6 (West 1982); KNIGHT ET AL., supra note 1,
at 62 ("If the arbitration agreement does not contain provisions for selecting an arbitrator,
the parties may agree among themselves at the time of the dispute to a particular arbitrator
or to particular selection procedures. If the parties are unable to agree, and the arbitration
is ad hoc, a party may petition the court to appoint a neutral arbitrator.").
26. Of course, parties are free to arbitrate their disputes in any way upon which they
can agree. See supra note 25; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282 (West 1982) ("Unless the
arbitration agreement otherwise provides... "). However, single and tripartite arbitration
are the two major methods of arbitrator selection. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBI-
TRATION LAW 78 n.11 (1992).
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parties submit their dispute to arbitration before a single, mutually
chosen arbitrator. In tripartite arbitration, the parties submit their
dispute to a panel consisting of two party arbitrators--one chosen by
each party-and a third neutral arbitrator chosen by agreement be-
tween the party arbitrators.2 7
The consensual nature of arbitration might seem to render the
question of arbitrator bias moot, because it is unlikely that parties
would agree to a hearing in front of an arbitrator who is biased against
them. For this reason, one may begin with the presumption that an
arbitrator is impartial.28 This presumption of neutrality can be rebut-
ted,29 however, and the arbitration award consequently vacated. For
the most part, the grounds for rebuttal are limited to evident partial-
ity, corruption, or arbitrator misconduct.30 However, as Common-
wealth Coatings demonstrates, even the impression of possible bias
may justify rebuttal of this presumption and a consequent vacation of
any arbitration award.
H. Legal Framework Governing the Impression of Possible
Bias
The landmark case vacating an arbitration award because of the
failure to disclose a relationship that gives rise to a impression of pos-
27. See COULSON, supra note 6, at 31; HOENIGER, supra note 5, § 1.08. Cases are
decided by majority vote, unless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides. See CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282(b).
28. The presumption of neutrality is strengthened through default rules of appoint-
ment promulgated by large-scale arbitrators such as the AAA. The AAA has adopted the
following default selection procedures to ensure impartiality when parties apply to the
AAA to select an arbitrator:
1. The AAA will send a specially prepared list of proposed arbitrators to each
party. Arbitrators are nominated by leaders in their industries or professions, and
are added to the list after the AAA has checked their qualifications and
reputations.
2. Parties may cross off objectionable arbitrators and number the remaining
names in order of preference. It is up to the parties to investigate proposed arbi-
trators, and they may get additional information from the AAA.
3. The lists are returned to the AAA, and mutually acceptable choices are noted.
If there are no mutually acceptable choices, additional lists may be submitted at
the request of both parties.
4. If the parties are unable to agree upon an arbitrator, the AAA will make
administrative appointments.
COULSON, supra note 6, at 14,18. These standards give both parties a voice in choosing the
arbitrator. Given this bilateral input, it is unlikely that a manifestly partial arbitrator will
be chosen to conduct any AAA arbitration hearing.
29. California provides a statutory catalog of circumstances that may rebut this pre-
sumption. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982). For the federal equivalent, see 9
U.S.C. § 10 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
30. See 9 U.S.C. § 10; see also CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1286.2(a), (b).
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sible bias is the United States Supreme Court's decision in Common-
wealth Coatings.31 California adopted this approach and applied it to
California's statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards in John-
ston v. Security Insurance Co.
32
A. The Seminal Case
In Commonwealth Coatings, the Supreme Court interpreted the
federal statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards. In addition
to recognizing the explicit statutory bases for vacating an award, Com-
monwealth Coatings found an implicit requirement that arbitrators
disclose to the parties "any dealings that might create an impression of
possible bias."'3
3
Commonwealth Coatings involved a construction dispute be-
tween a subcontractor, Commonwealth Coatings, and the surety to
the prime contractor's performance bond, Continental Casualty.34
Commonwealth Coatings successfully challenged an unfavorable arbi-
tration award because the neutral arbitrator failed to disclose close
financial relations between himself and the prime contractor. 35 The
neutral arbitrator regularly acted as an engineering consultant to the
prime contractor, generating fees of about $12,000 over five years. 36
The Court held that failure to disclose these previous dealings to
Commonwealth Coatings justified vacation of the award.37
The Supreme Court based its conclusion on its interpretation of
the United States Arbitration Act.38 Section 10(a) of the Act specifies
grounds for which vacation of an arbitration award is proper.39 Sec-
tions 10(a)(1) and (2), respectively, state that an award may be va-
cated if it is "procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means," or if
31. 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
32. 86 Cal. Rptr. 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
33. 393 U.S. at 149.
34. Id. at 146.
35. Id. at 147-50.
36. These fees were paid for services rendered on many different projects, including
those at issue in the dispute. Id. at 146.
37. Id. at 146-50.
38. Ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992)).
39. These include:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means, (2)
Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them, (3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party may have been prejudiced, and (4) Where the arbitrators exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
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"there [i]s evident partiality ... in the arbitrators." 4 The Court re-
jected lower court rulings that intimated that these subsections re-
quired a finding of actual fraud or bias.41 Recognizing that Congress
intended to provide for impartial arbitration,42 the Court held that ar-
bitrators must disclose to the parties any dealings that might create a
reasonable impression of possible bias.43 Failure to do so would re-
quire vacation of an arbitration award.
In Commonwealth Coatings, the Court found that the arbitrator's
financial relations with the prime contractor's surety created an im-
pression of possible bias. However, it reached its decision in con-
clusory terms and did not specify what kinds of relationships could
create this impression in other circumstances. The only guiding prin-
ciples for future arbitrators were the "impression of possible bias" test
and the facts of Commonwealth Coatings.
B. The California Approach
Like federal law, California law provides statutory grounds for
the vacation of arbitration awards.44 Subsections (a) and (b) of Cali-
fornia Civil Procedure Code section 1286.2 are nearly identical to
those provisions of the United States Arbitration Act considered in
Commonwealth Coatings. Those California provisions mandate the
vacation of an arbitration award if a court determines that "the award
was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means," or that
"there was corruption in any of the arbitrators."4 5
Based on these similarities, the court in Johnston v. Security In-
surance Corp.46 interpreted subsections (a) and (b) just as the
Supreme Court had interpreted the corresponding subsections of the
United States Arbitration Act in Commonwealth Coatings.47 In John-
ston, the claimants filed a claim for fire loss under their insurance pol-
icy.4 8 The claim was submitted to tripartite arbitration and resulted in
an award favoring the claimants.49
40. 9 U.S.C § 10(a)(1), (2).
41. 393 U.S. at 147-48.
42. Id. at 147.
43. Id. at 149. The Court further stated, "We cannot believe that it was the purpose of
Congress to authorize litigants to submit their cases and controversies to arbitration boards
that might reasonably be thought biased against one litigant and favorable to another." Id.
at 150.
44. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2.
45. CAT_ CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2(a), (b).
46. 86 Cal. Rptr. 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
47. Id. at 134-36.
48. Id. at 133.
49. Id. at 133-34.
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The court granted the insurer's motion to vacate because the fol-
lowing facts were not disclosed to the parties: (1) The neutral arbitra-
tor was acquainted with the claimants' counsel and the claimants'
party arbitrator; (2) The neutral arbitrator previously referred cases to
the claimants' party arbitrator; and (3) On the date of the arbitration
hearing, the claimants' party arbitrator represented a client referred
to him by the neutral arbitrator on an unrelated matter pending in
court.50 In light of these undisclosed facts, the court held:
[T]he undisputed facts bring... the arbitration proceedings under
review within the zone where the rule of Commonwealth Coatings is
applicable. The difference in the acquaintanceship being with
claimants' counsel and [claimants' party arbitrator] and the business
dealings being with [claimants' party arbitrator] directly instead of
directly with the claimants ... is insufficient to remove the acquain-
tanceship and dealings beyond the scope of creating an impression
of bias.
51
The court held that these factors, when taken as a whole, created an
impression of possible bias. However, the court did not clarify
whether there is a meaningful difference between mere acquaintance-
ships and business dealings. Nor did it discuss the difference, if any, in
relations between the neutral arbitrator and the claimants' counsel, or
between the neutral arbitrator and the claimants' party arbitrator.
While Johnston did not provide a clear rule, its analysis of Com-
monwealth Coatings gave some indication of what kind of relation-
ships would create an impression of bias in California. The opinion
noted that in Commonwealth Coatings the "failure to disclose even
sporadic but substantial business relationships with a party to the arbi-
tration constituted legal cause for vacating the award. ' 52 Thus, under
Johnston, "substantial business relationships" between the arbitrator
and one of the parties to the arbitration will trigger a duty to disclose.
MIl. Evolution of the California Approach
With Johnston's unclear language as their only guide, California
courts of appeal began to define the contours of what facts would cre-
ate an impression of bias and trigger a duty to disclose. Banwait v.
Hernandez53 was the first substantial attempt by a California court of
appeal to define the nature of those relationships that give rise to an
impression of possible bias. For this reason, Subpart A covers those
cases leading up to Banwait, Subpart B discusses the Banwait decision
itself, and Subpart C covers those post-Banwait cases that address the
50. Id. at 135-36.
51. Id. at 136.
52. Id. at 134.
53. 252 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
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impression of bias standard. Subpart D critically assesses the standard
as developed by the California courts.
A. Early Cases Addressing the Impression of Possible Bias
Whether an impression of possible bias arises from personal rela-
tionships is now settled law.5 4 Gonzales v. Interinsurance Exchange of
Automobile Club55 addressed this issue, holding that an arbitrator
need not disclose a purely personal relationship because such a rela-
tionship, standing alone, does not give rise to an impression of possi-
ble bias.5 6
In Gonzales, the claimant, Gonzales, sought to recover under the
uninsured motorist provision of his insurance policy, which was issued
by Interinsurance Exchange.5 7 The parties sent Gonzales's claim to
arbitration in accordance with American Arbitration Association
(AAA) rules, which resulted in an award in favor of Interinsurance
Exchange that Gonzales moved to vacate.5 8 Gonzales challenged the
award and claimed that the neutral arbitrator's longstanding "per-
sonal relationship" with a senior partner of the law firm representing
Interinsurance Exchange created an impression of possible bias.5 9
The issue on appeal was whether a purely personal relationship
between an arbitrator and one party's counsel required vacation of an
arbitration award. The court used the facts of Gonzales to tighten up
Johnston's loose language,60 holding that without something more,
such as a business-related element, a personal relationship does not
create an impression of possible bias.61
According to Gonzales, the personal relationships between the
neutral arbitrator and both claimants' counsel and claimants' party ar-
bitrator in Johnston were irrelevant to that decision. There, the grava-
men of the nondisclosure was the neutral arbitrator's business
dealings, not his social relations with the interested parties. Post-Gon-
zales cases have followed this method of analysis and required some-
thing more than a mere personal relationship to vacate an arbitration
award.62
54. See infra note 62.
55. 148 Cal. Rptr. 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
56. Id. at 285.
57. Id. at 283.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 284.
61. Id. at 285.
62. Other cases rejecting a motion to vacate based on pure personal relationship in-
clude San Luis Obispo Bay Properties, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 104 Cal. Rptr. 733
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (membership in same professional organization); Ray Wilson Corp. v.
Anaheim Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 213 Cal. Rptr. 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (longstanding
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The law is not as well-settled, however, with respect to business
relationships. San Luis Obispo Bay Properties, Inc. v. Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. 63 was the first case after Johnston to address these rela-
tionships. San Luis Obispo Bay Properties implies that business rela-
tionships bearing indicia of "favoritism or unusual preference" create
an impression of possible bias, and that nondisclosure of such relation-
ships justifies the vacation of an arbitration award.64
In San Luis Obispo Bay Properties, claimant San Luis Obispo
Bay Properties, Inc. (SLOBP) subleased land to Pacific Gas & Elec-
tric (PG&E) in return for PG&E's guarantee of repayment of loans
made by SLOBP.65 The amount of the guarantee was to be estab-
lished by independent appraisals of the value of the leasehold interest,
with any disagreements to be resolved by a mutually appointed arbi-
trator.66 The parties could not agree on the final amount of the guar-
antee and submitted the dispute to arbitration. 67 SLOBP challenged
the subsequent arbitration award, and alleged an impression of possi-
ble bias because the neutral arbitrator had referred one or two over-
flow cases per year to PG&E's appointed appraiser6 8 for no
consideration.69 Despite this relationship, the court refused to vacate
the arbitration award.
70
personal relationship); Banwait v. Hernandez, 252 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(longstanding personal relationship).
63. 104 Cal. Rptr. 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
64. Id. at 741. San Luis Obispo Bay Properties also moved to vacate the award be-
cause of connections between a company owned by the neutral arbitrator, Goode, and
Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E). Goode's company had performed substantial appraisal
work for the Irvine Company from 1951 to 1963. Id. at 742. One of Irvine's directors,
Robert Gerdes, was general counsel and vice president at PG&E during that time. Id. The
court held that no impression of bias was created due to this relationship because there was
"no evidence nor any suggestion that Mr. Gerdes dominated any of the corporations, or
that any of them was in any sense his alter ego.... Moreover, the trial court found ... that
Goode and Gerdes did not know one another and that no business or social relationship
between them had ever existed." Id.
As an aside, the court further acknowledged in dicta that practical limits constrained
the class of relationships requiring disclosure. An arbitrator cannot be expected to delve
too deeply in research to uncover past relationships, since "he cannot be expected to pro-
vide the parties with his complete and unexpurgated business biography." Id. at 742 (citing
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 150, 151 (1968)
(White, J., concurring)). Thus, prudential constraints limit the true class of relationships
that must be disclosed.
65. Id. at 736.
66. Id. at 736-37.
67. Id. at 737.
68. See infra note 73.
69. Id. at 741.
70. Id.
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The court noted that an indirect relationship between an arbitra-
tor and a party could create an impression of possible bias.71 It distin-
guished Johnston, where an indirect relationship requiring disclosure
arose from dealings between an arbitrator and an attorney for one of
the parties,72 holding that the dealings between the neutral arbitrator
and a party-appointed representative need not have been disclosed.7 3
The different relationships in these two cases-arbitrator and at-
torney in Johnston, arbitrator and party-appointed representative in
San Luis Obispo Bay Properties-do not explain the different results.
The court in San Luis Obispo Bay Properties focused on qualitative
differences between the two relationships, and denied the motion to
vacate because there was "no indication of any favoritism or unusual
preference[,] ... nothing, in short, that could be fairly said to create an
impression of possible bias as a matter of law."74 In holding that the
relationship between the neutral arbitrator and PG&E's appointed
appraiser did not create an impression of possible bias, the court rec-
ognized that it was important, though not determinative, that the ref-
erences were made for no consideration. 75
San Luis Obispo Bay Properties' "favoritism or unusual prefer-
ence" language is problematic because it suggests that vacation of an
arbitration award requires a finding of actual favoritism or unusual
preference. As Commonwealth Coating illustrates, however, the im-
pression of possible bias standard requires no such finding; the impres-
sion alone justifies vacating an award. Any requirement of an actual
finding would undermine the potency of the impression of possible
bias standard. San Luis Obispo Bay Properties' holding should be re-
formulated in recognition of this point. Properly reformulated, the
standard would require either a direct or indirect relationship between
the arbitrator and a party whose nature is such that there exists a possi-
bility of favoritism or unusual preference on the arbitrator's part.
Reformulation of the standard would not change the result in San
Luis Obispo Bay Properties. The mere reference of one or two over-
flow cases per year from the neutral arbitrator to PG&E's appointed
appraiser for no consideration does not give rise to a reasonable infer-
ence that there existed possible favoritism or unusual preference be-
tween the two. Although each may have derived a personal benefit
71. Id. at 742.
72. Id.
73. Although termed a party-appointed appraiser in the opinion, PG&E's appraiser
may be analyzed as a party-appointed arbitrator under the "tripartite" arbitration model.
For an explanation of the tripartite arbitration model, see supra text accompanying note
27.
74. San Luis Obispo Bay Properties, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 741.
75. Id.
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from the additional business, neither derived a personal benefit from
the act of referral itself.
76
Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital,77 decided four years after San Luis
Obispo Bay Properties, did not add much to the verbal formulation of
the impression of possible bias standard. It is nevertheless significant
because it calls for different levels of scrutiny depending upon the
neutral arbitrator's relation to the underlying controversy.78
In Wheeler, claimant Wheeler sued St. Joseph's Hospital and sev-
eral doctors for medical malpractice, and Wheeler's wife sued for loss
of consortium and emotional distress.79 Their claims were arbitrated
in accordance with the hospital's "Conditions of Admission" form,
which Wheeler had signed. 80 The Wheelers moved to vacate an unsat-
isfactory arbitration award. They noted that the medical member of
the arbitration panel failed to disclose that he rendered medical serv-
ices as an expert witness in an unrelated case for the law firm repre-
senting the principal doctor defendant in the arbitration. 81
The court found an impression of possible bias only in conclusory
terms and did little analysis to justify its vacation of the arbitration
award.82 The decision, however, was decided correctly under the re-
formulated San Luis Obispo Bay Properties standard. The doctor's
law firm retained the neutral arbitrator as an expert witness shortly
before the arbitration hearing. This business relationship was benefi-
cial to both parties; the arbitrator's services helped the law firm's case,
and the law firm conferred a financial benefit on the arbitrator for
services rendered. These close relations with strong financial motives
76. This formulation does not change the result in Johnston either. In Johnston the
neutral arbitrator previously referred cases to the claimants' arbitrator, and the claimants'
arbitrator represented one of those referred clients on the day of the arbitration in ques-
tion. The neutral arbitrator made these referrals for the professional and monetary benefit
of the claimants' arbitrator. Unlike the referral of overflow cases in San Luis Obispo Bay
Properties, the neutral arbitrator was not dumping off cases that he otherwise could not
handle. He conferred a present benefit to claimants' arbitrator, suggesting possible favorit-
ism or undue preference in the Johnston arbitration. This possibility was strengthened be-
cause of the party arbitrator's contemporaneous representation of a referred client on the
day of the arbitration hearing. See KNIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, 4:492.
77. 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
78. See infra text accompanying note 84.
79. Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
80. Id. at 778-79. The arbitration followed the AAA rules for medical malpractice
claims, and the neutral arbitration panel consisted of one medical doctor, one lawyer, and
one businessman provided by the AAA. Id. at 792.
81. Id.
82. The court noted two additional independent bases for vacation of the award.
First, there was no showing of valid assent on the part of the Wheelers to arbitration.
Second, the "arbitration option" in the hospital's admission agreement was too uncertain
and ambiguous to constitute an agreement to arbitrate on the part of the defendant doc-
tors. Id. at 790.
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for both parties created circumstances in which favoritism or prefer-
ence on the part of the arbitrator was clearly possible. The timing of
these relations-consummated as they were on the eve of the arbitra-
tion proceedings-augmented this possibility.83
In addition to its cursory impression of possible bias analysis, the
court in Wheeler also commented on the neutral arbitrator's position
on the arbitration panel, recognizing that "[t]he views of a medical
member of an arbitration panel deciding a medical malpractice claim
can manifestly influence the vote of the nonmedical members."
84
Since the medical member of the panel possessed specialized knowl-
edge about the substance of the underlying arbitration, the Wheeler
court closely scrutinized his contacts with the parties to the arbitra-
tion. Although not explicit on this point, Wheeler suggests that courts
will be more likely to vacate an award under the impression of possi-
ble bias standard when a neutral arbitrator possesses specialized
knowledge about the underlying controversy.
Figi v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.85 contributed further to the
impression of possible bias analysis.8 6 In a factual situation analogous
to Wheeler, the court implicitly rejected the idea that a "substantial
business relationship" is determined by the quantitative value of serv-
ices rendered. Rather, the nature and quality of the business relation-
ship determines its "substantiality." 87
In Figi, claimant Figi sustained fire loss and filed a claim with
New Hampshire Insurance Company.88 Figi's claim was submitted to
a tripartite appraisal panel8 9 pursuant to the terms of his insurance
83. KNIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, [ 4:492.
84. 133 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
85. 166 Cal. Rptr. 774 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
86. Gonzales, rendered in 1978 between the Wheeler and Figi opinions, focused pri-
marily on personal relationships. It did, however, address business relationships in dicta.
The court cited to Johnston's "substantial business relationship" language, and focused
on monetary benefits accruing to the neutral arbitrator. The court cited favorably both the
"close financial relationship" language of Commonwealth Coatings and language noting
the absence "of favoritism or unusual preference" in San Luis Obispo Bay Properties. See
Gonzales, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 285-86 (citing San Luis Obispo Bay Properties, 104 Cal. Rptr. at
741-42).
87. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
88. 166 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
89. Figi did not concern a traditional arbitration award because the case involved the
settlement of fire insurance claims. In addition to the California Code of Civil Procedure
provisions relating to arbitration, arbitration provisions in fire insurance contracts are gov-
erned by the California Insurance Code. Id at 777. Specifically, the Insurance Code man-
dates particular "appraisal" procedures in the event the provider and the insured disagree
about the actual cash value of a loss. See CAT. INs. CODE §§ 2071, 2072 (West 1972). In
the event of disagreement, each party shall select a "competent and disinterested" ap-
praiser, and the two selected appraisers then choose a third appraiser. CAL. INS. CODE
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policy.90 Figi moved to vacate an unfavorable award because of undis-
closed business dealings between the neutral arbitrator, an account-
ant, and New Hampshire's party arbitrator. Between the time the
arbitrator agreed to preside over Figi's claim and the time he deliv-
ered the award, the neutral arbitrator worked as an accountant for
New Hampshire's party arbitrator in five unrelated matters that gen-
erated fees of $847. 91
In vacating the award, the court modified the Johnston test and
recognized the need to disclose any "repeated or significant con-
tacts" 92 an arbitrator has with a party to the dispute. In light of these
five accounting jobs, the neutral arbitrator's relationship with New
Hampshire's party arbitrator was indeed substantial. As the court
noted, a neutral arbitrator "cannot be described as 'disinterested'
when he has done business with an insurance company's [arbitrator]
during the pendency of an appraisal involving the company." 93
Figi shows that quantitatively immaterial relations might never-
theless be "substantial" relations. Figi placed great emphasis on the
monetary insignificance of services rendered as an accountant. How-
ever, the relationship was "substantial" despite generating only $847
for the neutral arbitrator. This emphasis on qualitative substantiality
is proper. Rather than focusing on the amount of fees generated by
the arbitrator, Figi correctly focused on the nature of the relationship
generating the monetary benefit.94
Park Plaza, Ltd. v. Pietz95 addressed the money-generating as-
pects of business relationships and underscored the significance of fi-
§ 2071. "The specific requirement [that] appraisers be 'disinterested' is not a requirement
for arbitrators generally in other areas of the law." Id.
Although the Figi court cited all of the impression of possible bias cases discussed so
far in this Note, it did not clearly state the basis for its opinion that the arbitration award
should be vacated. It merely held that the business done between the neutral arbitrator
and New Hampshire's party arbitrator furnished a basis for "vacating the award under
Insurance Code Section 2071 and Code of Civil Procedure Section 1286.2 read together."
Id. at 778 (emphasis added).
The facts of Figi, standing alone, would lead to a violation of § 1286.2(c). In Figi, the
court used evidence of the neutral arbitrator's dealings to determine that he was "inter-
ested" within the meaning of Insurance Code § 2071. Since § 2071 is an administrative
code provision which merely sets out the required form for the California Standard Form
Life Insurance Policy, the court must have concluded that application of Civil Procedure
Code § 1286.2 to the facts formed the basis for vacating the award.
90. 166 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 777.
93. Id. at 778.
94. On this point, see George L. Blum, Disclosing Conflict of Interest in the California
Arbitration System, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 97, 110 (1989).
95. 239 Cal. Rptr. 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
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nancial benefits flowing to the neutral arbitrator.96 Park Plaza held
that an arbitrator is not bound to disclose an appointment as a discov-
ery referee in an unrelated case involving the attorneys for one of the
parties, when that arbitrator cannot fairly be said to have an employ-
ment relationship analogous to that of an independent contractor.
97
In Park Plaza, claimant Park Plaza entered into a joint venture
with several investors doing business under the name of the Fess
Parker-Red Lion Hotel.98 Each party gave a right of first refusal to
the other party, capable of being exercised if either Park Plaza or the
investors put their interest in the hotel up for sale.99 The investors
later expressed a desire to sell their interest, and Park Plaza merely
protested this proposed sale, rather than exercising their right of first
refusal to the terms of sale.100 Park Plaza then demanded arbitration
pursuant to the joint venture agreement to prevent the investors from
selling their interest in the hotel. 01 The neutral arbitrator ruled that
the right of first refusal had been recognized and had expired by Park
Plaza's failure to act.1°2
Park Plaza challenged the award on the grounds that the neutral
arbitrator failed to disclose his appointment as a discovery referee in a
previous unrelated case. Park Plaza noted that the same law firm that
96. Two years before Park Plaza, Ray Wilson Corp. v. Anaheim Memorial Hosp.
Ass'n, 213 Cal. Rptr. 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), addressed the appearance of possible bias
from a different perspective. In Ray Wilson Corp., the court held that any possible benefit
to be gained by establishment of industry standards was insufficient as a matter of law to
require vacation of an arbitration award due to the impression of possible bias. Id. at 66.
Anaheim claimed that one of the neutral arbitrators, an experienced contractor, stood to
benefit from the arbitration because the construction arbitration could establish industry-
wide standards for the electrical industry. Id. at 65. Anaheim alleged an appearance of
possible bias on this ground, but the court rejected this contention. Id. Although the arbi-
trator stood to benefit personally from the arbitration's outcome, this possibility did not
create an impression of possible bias. Id. at 66. This recognizes the principle enunciated
by California courts of appeal that possible monetary benefits accruing to an arbitrator will
not justify vacation of an arbitration award as a matter of law.
Missing here was Johnston's "substantial business relationship." In the context of es-
tablishing industry-wide standards, the arbitrator did not have a direct relationship with
the parties, their counsel, or any of the other two neutral arbitrators. He simply stood to
benefit from the outcome of the hearing, and had no direct interest tied to either party.
The fact that industry-wide standards would be established if Ray Wilson were to prevail
was irrelevant to the decision. The absence of any significant business opportunities or
dealings arising from a relationship with one of the parties is determinative of the issue.
Simply put, there could be no impression of possible bias without some substantial business
relation, despite the possibility of monetary benefit.
97. 239 Cal. Rptr. at 53.




102. Id. at 52-53.
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represented two of the investors represented one of the parties in that
unrelated case. 0 3 Park Plaza alleged that this nondisclosure
amounted to corruption under California Civil Procedure Code sec-
tion 1286.2(b) alone.104
The court evaluated this relationship under the impression of
possible bias standard, citing Johnston and Wheeler, even though the
complaint was couched in terms of section 1286.2(b). 10 5 The court dis-
cussed California's statutory provisions governing the appointment of
court referees'0 6 and "construed such a court-appointed referee as a
subordinate judicial officer, [one] performing services for the court,
and receiving compensation fixed by the court. In no sense [was the
neutral arbitrator] an employee or an independent contractor of the
parties or their attorneys."' 0 7 For these reasons, the facts did not
"demonstrate any business relationship, substantial or otherwise, be-
tween the arbitrator and respondent's counsel or clients of respon-
dent's counsel.' 0
8
Park Plaza tied together the "substantial business relationship"
of Johnston with a particular employment-type relationship. The neu-
tral arbitrator could not maintain a business relationship with the in-
vestors' law firm without being its employee. Additionally, San Luis
Obispo Bay Properties strongly suggests that there would not be any
impression of possible bias in this case even if the parties had paid the
neutral arbitrator's fees. While court-appointed referees do conduct
discovery hearings, they are subordinate to the court and do not pro-
vide services that are severable from the judicial function.10 9 The neu-
tral arbitrator's sole function was to conduct hearings and provide
recommendations to the trial judge. He remained detached from the
103. Id. at 53.
104. Id.
105. Park Plaza's use of the impression of possible bias standard is significant.
Although the complaint alleged a violation of § 1286.2, the court applied the Common-
wealth Coatings-Johnston standard, a standard derived from the interstices of the explicit
statutory grounds for justifying arbitration awards. Thus, it appears this the standard will
be used in all cases arising under an implicit violation of § 1286.2(a) or (b) (Le., cases
alleging a violation of those sections when there is no outright corruption or fraud in the
award or in the arbitrators themselves).
106. These sections state that the court may direct a referee when necessary "to hear
and determine any and all discovery motions and disputes relevant to discovery in the
action and to report findings and make a recommendation thereon," and that the court
may order parties to pay fees of referees who are not employees or officers of the court.
239 Cal. Rptr. at 53 (citing CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 639(e), 645.1 (West Supp. 1993)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. With regard to findings of a referee appointed pursuant to the provisions of § 639,
findings of fact concerning a collateral matter (such as discovery issues) are not binding on
the court unless and until adopted by it. Chiarodit v. Chiarodit, 21 P.2d 562, 563 (Cal.
1933).
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ultimate decision-making authority with respect to discovery rulings.
The neutral arbitrator's "employment" by the firm could not create
the possibility of favoritism or unusual preference, despite the pay-
ment of fees directly from the firm pursuant to statutory directive.
Therefore, no substantial business relationship requiring disclosure
would exist.
B. Banwait v. Hernandez"0
Banwait marked the first substantial attempt to characterize the
true nature of the business relationship that creates an impression of
possible bias, some sixteen years after San Luis Obispo Bay Proper-
ties' "favoritism and unusual preference" formulation.
In Banwait, claimant Banwait sought to recover under the unin-
sured motorist provision of his insurance policy from the California
State Automobile Association (CSAA) for injuries suffered in an au-
tomobile accident."' Banwait commenced arbitration proceedings in
accordance with his policy, and when the two parties could not agree
to a mutually acceptable arbitrator, the court appointed an arbitrator
pursuant to Banwait's petition.11 2 Banwait was unsatisfied with the
arbitrator's award, and subsequently filed a motion to vacate.1 13 He
alleged that a year before the arbitration, the neutral arbitrator hired
CSAA's law firm (though not the particular lawyer appearing in the
arbitration) to represent him in a lawsuit, which generated about $400
in legal fees for the firm. 11
4
The court held that the neutral arbitrator's relations with CSAA's
law firm did not create an impression of possible bias." 5 The opinion
borrowed from Johnston, suggesting that a substantial business rela-
tionship between the arbitrator and one of the parties to the arbitra-
tion triggers a duty to disclose. However, the court in Banwait
suggested that a substantial business relationship involves something
more than a mere pecuniary interest, and stated that "the existence of
bias depends on whether one can draw an inference of favoritism not
because the arbitrator may receive money but because the arbitrator
has a business-connected relationship that may lead him or her to
place unusual trust or confidence in one side as opposed to the
other."116
110. 252 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
111. Id. at 648.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Banwait provided alternative grounds to support his motion to vacate by not-
ing that the arbitrator was a longstanding friend of a partner in CSAA's law firm. The
court rejected this contention, citing Gonzales. Id. at 651.
115. Id. at 652.
116. Id.
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Banwait marks the first substantial attempt by a court to charac-
terize the nature of those relationships that create an impression of
possible bias and trigger a duty to disclose. However, it can be criti-
cized because its language could conceivably require disclosure of
every business or employment relationship that bears upon the parties
to an arbitration hearing, their counsel, or their appointed arbitrators.
A more careful reading of Banwait demonstrates that Banwait's
language augments both Johnston and San Luis Obispo Bay Proper-
ties. A substantial business relationship is one characterized by an at-
mosphere of pervasive trust and confidence-that is, one in which the
possibility for "favoritism or unusual preference" on the part of the
arbitrator is real. This formulation goes to the core of the impression
of possible bias standard. Banwait, standing by itself, says that vaca-
tion of an award is proper if a business relationship "may lead [the
arbitrator] to place unusual trust or confidence in one side as opposed
to the other.11 7 The opinion is overinclusive in this respect, however,
since every employment relationship may arguably lead the parties to
place unusual trust or confidence in each other.
The logic of Banwait does not explicitly require a relationship of
trust or confidence. Rather, it requires a continuing relationship char-
acterized by trust and confidence that may conceivably give rise to
unusually preferential, though unintended, treatment on a particular
future instance. In other words, when the relationship is so close that
unintended trust and confidence might influence the decision of the
arbitrator, it must be disclosed. Pervasive trust and confidence, per-
meating a business relationship, 18 triggers the duty to disclose.
The facts of Banwait illustrate that the court was unwilling to fol-
low its own overinclusive standard. If what is truly important is a
business-connected relationship that may lead the arbitrator to place
unusual trust or confidence in one particular party, then the court
erred in refusing to vacate the award. By retaining the law firm, the
neutral arbitrator engaged in a business-connected relationship in
which he undoubtedly formed opinions and impressions about its pro-
fessional capability. It is conceivable that the neutral arbitrator might
carry these impressions, either positive or negative, to future arbitra-
tion hearings involving that same law firm. Were the impressions pos-
itive, he could easily overestimate the capabilities of its
representation; were they negative, he might dismiss its advocacy
117. Id.
118. In light of this, it would seem that personal relationships would be the relation-
ships most likely to create an impression of possible bias, because trust and confidence
most definitely pervade those relationships. However, this contention is foreclosed by
Gonzales and its progeny.
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based upon past experience, rather than on true reflection on the is-
sues at hand.
Vacation of the award might seem extreme in fight of the small
amount of legal services rendered. The court recognized this point,
noting that "the services rendered by the firm to the neutral arbitrator
were insignificant."1 19 However, if courts are concerned with the na-
ture of the relationship in determining what creates an impression of
possible bias, as they should be,120 the magnitude of services rendered
should be irrelevant. Wheeler clearly supports this qualitative method
of analysis. 21 To let pure quantitative distinctions factor into the con-
sideration is to disregard Banwait's own admonition that a duty to
disclose stems from something more than a mere pecuniary interest.
The court should have either taken the "trust and confidence" stan-
dard as it stood and lived with an unpalatable application, or it should
have searched for a better standard.
C. Post-Banwait
Only two cases decided after Banwait address the issue of vacat-
ing an award for failure to disclose a relationship that creates an im-
pression of possible bias'22-Tate v. Saratoga Savings & Loan'23 and
119. Id.
120. See Blum, supra note 94, at 110.
121. See Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
122. Two recent post-Banwait decisions discuss the impression of possible bias stan-
dard. The first was Betz v. Pankow, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (Betz 1), in
which the court reached its decision without ever deciding whether an impression of possi-
ble bias was created. In Betz I, Betz and Pankow formed a partnership "for the purpose of
owning and operating property." Ii at 835. The parties could not agree on the manner of
dissolution of the partnership, and submitted their dispute to arbitration under the aus-
pices of the AAA, pursuant to the terms of the partnership agreement. A tripartite panel
was selected, consisting of two males and one female. Id. Betz moved to vacate an unfa-
vorable award, charging that the male panelists were improperly influenced by gender bias
against her, and that this bias satisfied the impression of possible bias standard. Id. at 835-
36. She relied on declarations by the female arbitrator, which stated in conclusory terms
that the male arbitrators, in arriving at their decision, considered irrelevant and improper
matters outside of the record that reflected gender bias. Id. at 839. The court denied
relief, holding that the declarations were "entirely conclusual" and "irrelevant[ ] since the
[impression of possible bias] test is objective and judged by the perspective of the hypo-
thetical reasonable person." I&
The second case, Betz v. Pankow, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (Betz I1),
arose out of the proceedings of Betz I and discussed the impression of possible bias stan-
dard in greater detail. There, the neutral arbitrator's former law firm had represented
three businesses owned or controlled by Pankow. The court stated that this relationship
created an impression of possible bias, but denied Betz's motion to vacate on jurisdictional
grounds.
Betz II was reminiscent of Wheeler in that it found an impression of possible bias only
in conclusory terms. Id. at 843 ("This clearly presents an impression of possible bias.").
However, the case was rightly decided under the impression of possible bias standard de-
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Neaman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital.2 4 Curiously, neither case cites
Banwait. This failure to consider Banwait might be a signal that the
California courts of appeal reject its overinclusive language. The logic
of Neaman suggests, however, that reading Banwait as an extension of
both Johnston and San Luis Obispo Bay Properties correctly charac-
terizes the true nature of the business relationship that must be
disclosed.
Tate was the first case decided after Banwait to address this issue.
It peripherally raised the impression of possible bias standard in a tri-
partite arbitration arrangement. In Tate, Saratoga attempted to dis-
credit Tate's party arbitrator.'2 5 The most substantial ground for
vacating the arbitration award was that the party arbitrator failed to
disclose that he became embroiled in a fee dispute when he repre-
sented one of the corporations owned by Saratoga's chief executive
officer in an unrelated action.
12 6
Tate is important because it illustrates what relationships fall
outside of the Commonwealth Coatings-Johnston framework, but it
does not help define the nature of the business relationship that must
be disclosed. The court summarily dispensed with the impression of
bias analysis and rejected Saratoga's argument, 2 7 holding that there
was no impression of possible bias because the challenged relationship
involved Tate's party arbitrator. As the court noted, Johnston's hold-
ing "was limited to the neutral arbitrator involved ... and not to the
party arbitrators also involved.' 28 Since the party arbitrator's rela-
tionship fell outside of the Commonwealth Coatings-Johnston frame-
work, there could be no impression of bias requiring disclosure.
veloped in Part III.D of this Note. The neutral arbitrator's law firm represented corpora-
tions owned or controlled by Pankow while the arbitrator was still with the firm. Id.
Because the law firm acted as the corporations' advocate in business-related matters, an
atmosphere of pervasive trust and confidence clearly existed between the law firm and the
corporations. This relationship may be imputed to the neutral arbitrator because he was a
partner of the firm at the time. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.10 (1983) (imputed disqualification of attorneys). This relationship may likewise be
imputed to Pankow by virtue of his actual control over the corporations at issue.
123. 265 Cal. Rptr. 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
124. 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
125. Id. at 449.
126. Id. Other attacks by Saratoga on Tate's party arbitrator, Mazetti, included claims
that Mazetti misinformed another party arbitrator regarding the availability of a retired
judge to serve as a neutral arbitrator; that Mazetti "improperly unsurped [sic] the nondele-
gable responsibility of the neutral arbitrator to rule on objections and the admission of
evidence"; and that the arbitrators failed to find on all issues presented to them. Id. at 449-
50. The court rejected these naked attempts to vacate a proper award, and stated that
"[wihen the smoke clears from Saratoga's ... challenges ... no impropriety is found." Id.
at 450.
127. Id. at 448-50.
128. Id. at 449.
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Neaman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital addressed in greater detail
the nature of the business relationship that must be disclosed, focusing
on direct employment of a neutral arbitrator by a party to the arbitra-
tion that exhibits some indication of a partial relationship. In
Neaman, the claimants, the Neamans, filed an action against Kaiser
for medical malpractice in connection with treatment of their de-
ceased relative.129 The parties submitted the matter to tripartite arbi-
tration pursuant to the decedent's health care agreement with
Kaiser.130 This resulted in an award favoring the hospital. The
Neamans moved to vacate this award for the neutral arbitrator's fail-
ure to disclose a business relationship that the Neamans thought gave
rise to an impression of possible bias.131
The Neamans charged that a substantial business relationship
arose from the neutral arbitrator's previous arbitration experience in-
volving Kaiser. According to the neutral arbitrator:
[Thirty] percent of his professional time since... retirement from
the bench had been spent as an arbitrator in Kaiser matters; 65 per-
cent of that time was spent as a claimant's party arbitrator, 30 per-
cent [of that time] as the neutral arbitrator and 5 percent [of the
time] (about 5 cases) as Kaiser's [party] arbitrator. 132
The court of appeal vacated this award because the neutral arbitrator
failed to unambiguously disclose his experience as a party arbitrator
for Kaiser. 33
Though the neutral arbitrator had significant previous dealings
with Kaiser, only his experience as Kaiser's party arbitrator created a
"substantial business relationship" and triggered a duty to disclose.
The quantitative insignificance-five cases out of 300--of his experi-
ence as Kaiser's party arbitrator was irrelevant. More important was
the nature of this representation.
The arbitrator's previous experience as both a claimant's arbitra-
tor and a neutral arbitrator did not trigger a duty to disclose because it
was not characterized by an atmosphere of pervasive trust and confi-
dence. When he acted as a claimant's party arbitrator, he did so as the
representative of Kaiser's adversary. In this capacity the arbitrator
did not have any relationship with Kaiser, let alone one characterized
by pervasive trust and confidence. Similarly, such a relationship was
absent when he acted as a neutral arbitrator in previous Kaiser mat-
ters. In these matters he was chosen not by Kaiser alone to be its
representative, but rather by two competing actors to be a neutral
arbitrator.
129. 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 880.
130. Id
131. Id. at 881.
132. Id
133. Id. at 883.
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The arbitrator's relationship with Kaiser as party arbitrator, how-
ever, was an employment-type relationship requiring disclosure de-
spite its quantitative insignificance. As Kaiser's party arbitrator, he
accepted payment to represent the hospital's interest in matters of
conflict. As Kaiser's "agent," he conducted his representation with
complete openness toward the hospital. Since a party arbitrator is se-
lected precisely because of the perception that the arbitrator will favor
the party's interests,'13 his relationship with Kaiser was characterized
by an atmosphere of pervasive trust and confidence. Failure to dis-
close this relationship justified vacation of the arbitration award.
D. The Standard: What It Is and What It Should Be
The cases discussed above illustrate the ambiguity in this area of
the law. San Luis Obispo Bay Properties highlighted an essential truth
by stating, "In the final analysis, each case must depend on its own
facts.' 1 35 Fact-specific inquiry smothers the crisp application of rule-
based doctrine. Critics and cynics alike might maintain that fact-spe-
cific inquiry means each case turns on a particular judge's idea of what
may possibly be perceived as creating an impression of possible bias.
However, several common threads emerge from the case law dis-
cussed in this Note. Arbitrators who are aware of these commonali-
ties can render awards resistant to judicial attack.
As Gonzales and later cases make clear, a personal relationship
between the arbitrator and one of the parties, counsel for one of the
parties, or one of the other arbitrators in the arbitration proceeding,
will not create an impression of possible bias standing alone. This cat-
egorical rule has been followed in every "personal relationship" case.
Without something more, such as business-related dealings, no duty to
disclose exists. 136
Either direct or indirect business-related dealings between an ar-
bitrator and a party to arbitration may create an impression of possi-
ble bias under certain circumstances. California courts of appeal have
grappled with a precise characterization of those circumstances.
Although no case has resolved the issue, five cases have created five
formulations of the impression of possible bias standard:
134. See Tate, 265 Cal. Rptr at 449.
135. San Luis Obispo Bay Properties, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 742 (citing Colony Liquor Dis-
trib., Inc. v. Local 699, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 312 N.Y.S.2d 403, 405 (N.Y. App. Div.
1970)).
136. But see supra note 118.
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Johnston Substantial Business
Relationship
San Luis Obispo Bay Properties Indication of Favoritism or
Unusual Preference
Figi Significant or Substantial
Contacts
Park Plaza Independent Contractor-
Business Relationship
Banwait Relationship That May
Lead Arbitrator to Place
Unusual Trust or
Confidence in One Side or
the Other
An alternative approach would be to say that a relationship re-
quiring disclosure is defined by what a reasonable person would con-
sider to be a relationship that gives rise to bias.137 This reasonable
person approach works well in other areas of the law138 because it
assigns to the accused the duty to act according to community norms.
However, arbitration involves the specialized skill and judgment of a
quasi-judicial actor, and the standard for disclosure should reflect this
specialized skill, not community norms.
Banwait's "trust and confidence" rationale is a step in the right
direction because it properly focuses on the nature of the neutral arbi-
trator's relations. The use of the word "may," however, suggests that
a huge class of relationships must be disclosed.1 39 This literal reading
should be contrasted with the respective holdings of Johnston and San
Luis Obispo Bay Properties. These cases temper the broad language
of Banwait by confining the class of relationships that must be dis-
closed to those characterized by an atmosphere of pervasive trust and
confidence. Perhaps these types of relationships are what Banwait
had in mind when it used the word "unusual" to qualify its formula-
tion, but the word "unusual" defies practical definition. While not
without its own ambiguities, the "atmosphere of pervasive trust and
confidence" formulation provides the most objective standard to date
to describe the nature of those relationships that give rise to an im-
pression of possible bias.
137. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I know
it when I see it...
138. Two examples are negligence ("Did defendant use reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances?") and corporate proxy statement disclosure requirements ("Did the buyer-
seller disclose all information that a reasonable investor would consider important in de-
ciding whether to sell-buy?").
139. See supra Part III.C.
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IV. How Does the Impression of Possible Bias Standard
Apply to "Institutional" Arbitrators?
Two of the nation's largest banks, Bank of America and Wells
Fargo, have recently introduced arbitration clauses into their commer-
cial contracts. 140 Both organizations make use of "institutional" arbi-
trators in their arbitration clauses: Bank of America names the AAA,
and Wells Fargo designates Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Serv-
ices, Inc. (JAMS). 141 Contractual arbitration provisions involving
large repeat customers and institutional arbitrators raise interesting
questions about the disclosure of relationships that give rise to an im-
pression of possible bias. These questions are significant because
"[w]ith ADR companies getting many cases from [large corporate cli-
ents], private judges could feel pressured to favor big clients and pre-
serve their relationships at the expense of the individual plaintiff."'142
Since the Bank of America and Wells Fargo plans provide for
impartial arbitrators, 143 these impartial arbitrators are required to dis-
close relationships that would give rise to an impression of possible
bias under the Commonwealth Coatings-Johnston line of cases. How-
ever, these financial institutions provide repeat business to these insti-
tutional arbitrators. A question arises whether this repeated referral
of business gives rise to an impression of possible bias on the part of
individual arbitrators if those arbitrators do not otherwise maintain re-
lationships that give rise to an impression of possible bias. This Part
examines that question.144
The AAA is a public, nonprofit arbitration clearinghouse,
founded in 1926 to encourage the use of arbitration and other tech-
niques of voluntary dispute resolution."45 By contrast, JAMS is a pri-
vate corporation whose sole activity is providing private judges to
preside over arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution hear-
ings. JAMS boasts annual revenues of $24 million and offers the serv-
ices of 178 retired judges who conduct nonbinding mediations, binding
140. Robert M. Smith, Commercial Transactions, RECORDER, July 30, 1992, at 8.
141. Id.
142. Nicholas Varchaver, Dispute Resolution, AM. LAW., Apr. 1992, at 60 (quoting
Daniel Weinstein, Vice-Chairman of JAMS); see also Badie v. Bank of Am., No. 944916,
para. 22(a) (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 4, 1992) ("Defendant's practice is also unfair because
it... [slubstitutes for courts and juries ... a process for dispute resolution which is biased
in favor of business interests and will be biased in favor of the defendant bank as one of its
best customers.").
143. Fein, supra note 20.
144. It is important to note that this discussion is not limited to Bank of America, Wells
Fargo, or any other financial institution. The issues raised here confront all contractual
provisions between institutional arbitrators and corporate clients, where third parties are
required to arbitrate any dispute with that client's designated arbitration provider.
145. COULSON, supra note 6, at 8.
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arbitrations, and other "private judging" options.146 It does not offer
the broad education-related services and seminars that AAA does.
As a private corporation, JAMS maintains a financial stake in the
outcome of every arbitration hearing; it stands to benefit financially
from every matter submitted to it for arbitration by Wells Fargo. It
has a direct interest in the volume of business done, and thus has a
stake in maintaining satisfied institutional clients that constitute a
source of repeat volume business. The vitality of the corporation as a
whole depends in part upon the continued referral of matters to
JAMS for arbitration, as does the welfare of its arbitrator employees.
AAA has a lesser financial stake in matters submitted to them for
arbitration, but it has a financial stake nonetheless. While it is true
that AAA is a nonprofit corporation, this does not mean it will not
benefit from the continued referral of matters for arbitration. AAA's
management, officers, and other employees depend upon the vitality
of the organization because their continued employment depends
upon AAA's continued existence.
Thus, each organization essentially has a "stake" in the continued
vitality of their operations (and, derivatively, in the continuation of
their relations with the aforementioned financial institutions). How-
ever, the "stakeholders" are different with respect to each organiza-
tion. For JAMS, the stakeholders are the corporation's shareholders;
for the AAA, the stakeholders are those employed directly by the
organization. A question arises whether this different identity of
stakeholders has any significance in the impression of possible bias
analysis. This Part also examines this question.
A. The Bank of America and Wells Fargo Agreements
Bank of America includes an arbitration clause in all checking,
savings, and VISA-MasterCard accounts established after June 2,
1992.147 This clause states that all controversies involving one account
or two or more accounts with at least one common owner will be de-
cided by arbitration under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
AAA.
14 8
In contrast, Wells Fargo requires a four-step procedure to resolve
all consumer checking, savings, and credit card disputes exceeding
$25,000.149 The four steps comprise informal negotiations, mediation
146. Varchaver, supra note 142.
147. BANK OF AMERICA, ANNOUNCING CHANGES TO BANK OF AMERICA'S DEPOSIT
AccouNT PROGRAMS (June 1992); BANK OF AMERICA, CHANGE OF TERMS NOncE FOR
BANKAMERICARD VISA, MASTERCARD, VISA GOLD, GOLD MASTERCARD AND APOLLO
AccouNTs (June 1992).
148. Id.
149. WELLS FARGO, AN IMPORTANT NO-= FOR ALL AccouNT HOLDERS (July
1992).
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before a JAMS judge, trial before a JAMS judge, and binding arbitra-
tion before a JAMS judge governed by federal arbitration law.150 If
JAMS is unable to provide an arbitrator, Wells Fargo's arbitration
provisions allow for selection of arbitrators by the AAA. 151
B. Applying the Standard
The banks and their customers jointly apply to either the AAA or
JAMS to resolve their disputes. Under these arrangements, the banks
are repeat customers of these institutional arbitrators, but each bank
does not necessarily appear before an individual AAA or JAMS arbi-
trator more than once. One must take this into account when apply-
ing the impression of possible bias standard.
Part III showed that, under current case law, substantial business
relationships requiring disclosure arise from direct or indirect rela-
tionships between a particular party and a particular neutral arbitra-
tor. Accordingly, if an individual JAMS or AAA arbitrator selected
under an arbitration clause has had a previous significant business re-
lationship with either bank, 152 then that arbitrator must disclose that
relationship. 53
A different question is whether these arbitration clauses create a
blanket impression of possible bias by virtue of the repeat business the
banks provide. Must individual JAMS or AAA arbitrators unambigu-
ously disclose the relations of their employers with Bank of America
or Wells Fargo 54 when they preside over a customer dispute? Fram-
ing the question this way raises two additional and related questions.
First, does the relationship between a financial institution and an insti-
tutional arbitration provider rise to the level of a significant business
relationship that an individual arbitrator is required to disclose? Sec-
ond, if disclosure is required, do the customer agreements 155 provide
the "unambiguous disclosure" required under Neaman?
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Under Neaman, merely selecting a particular arbitrator under either the Wells
Fargo or Bank of America arbitration provisions does not create a significant business
relationship requiring disclosure. This is because the arbitrator is chosen to serve as a
neutral arbitrator, rather than as the party arbitrator of either bank.
153. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. The arbitrator must also disclose any
previous significant business relationship with the claiming party in these banking disputes.
154. An arbitrator chosen under these arbitration clauses maintains an indirect rela-
tionship with the banks. The banks employ, under these arbitration clauses, the industrial
arbitrators. The institutional arbitrators, in turn, employ (in the case of JAMS) or provide
(in the case of AAA) the individual arbitrators chosen.
155. The complaint in Badie suggests that the customer agreement provides no en-
forceable contract between the parties. Badie v. Bank of Am., No. 944916, para. 1 (Cal.
Super. Ct. filed Aug. 4, 1992).
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(1) The Impression of Possible Bias as Applied to Institutional Arbitrators
Concerning the first question, it appears that the significance of
the business relationship differs between both financial institutions
and their designated institutional arbitrators. Each of the financial in-
stitutions in a sense "employs" the institutional arbitrators through
their arbitration clauses. Whether this "employment" rises to the
level of a substantial business relationship depends, as seen in Part III,
on the nature of the employment relationship.
Under the modified Banwait standard, the appropriate inquiry is
whether a relationship characterized by an atmosphere of pervasive
trust and confidence exists between the financial institutions and the
institutional arbitrators. The AAA, as a nonprofit corporation, does
not stand to gain as an institution from Bank of America's continued
referral of matters. However, those employed directly by the AAA
(i.e., its officers, managers, and other employees) benefit from the
continued referral because keeping the AAA going keeps them
employed.
However, this benefit does not give rise to an atmosphere of per-
vasive trust and confidence between Bank of America and the AAA;
those employees deriving a benefit from the continued acts of referral
have no real influence over the decisions made by the individual
AAA arbitrators hearing Bank of America matters. Since the deci-
sion makers are for the most part divorced from those who would
benefit from continued acts of referral, it cannot be said that there is
an atmosphere of pervasive trust and confidence between the AAA as
an institution and the Bank of America.1
56
Application of the impression of possible bias is less clear with
regard to the Wells Fargo-JAMS relationship. There, JAMS, as a
profit-seeking corporation, has a direct financial stake in every matter
submitted to it for arbitration. If this source of business were to sud-
denly evaporate, JAMS as an institution would suffer. For this reason,
JAMS has a vested interest in the Wells Fargo arrangement. Whether
an atmosphere of pervasive trust and confidence exists in this interest
presents a closer question than in the Bank of America-AAA ar-
rangement. Arguably, such an atmosphere does exist, because JAMS
places trust and confidence in Wells Fargo to continue referring mat-
ters to it for arbitration, and this trust and confidence pervades the
relationship.
156. The individual AAA arbitrators appointed under the Bank of America-AAA
agreement do stand to benefit from the act of appointment in the sense that such appoint-
ments provide those arbitrators with additional business. But this benefit is no different
from benefits deriving from AAA appointments outside of the Bank of America-AAA
agreement. For this reason, no impression of possible bias would arise on the part of indi-
vidual arbitrators appointed under the Bank of America-AAA agreement.
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Cast in these terms, the Wells Fargo-JAMS arrangement may
properly be classified as a substantial business relationship.157 How-
ever, this may stretch the modified Banwait standard too far. The
"trust and confidence" in this situation arises from the hope of contin-
ued future business, rather than from impressions formed through
past business dealings.
The benefit accruing to JAMS's shareholders, however, presents
a stronger case for the existence of a relationship characterized by an
atmosphere of pervasive trust and confidence. JAMS shareholders
have a degree of influence over the decisions made by individual
JAMS arbitrators through their ownership interest in the corporation.
The shareholders are residual owners of the corporation and reserve
the power to make decisions regarding the future employment of par-
ticular arbitrators. 158 At the same time they stand to benefit from
Wells Fargo's continued acts of referral. Thus, those who stand to
benefit financially from the Wells Fargo-JAMS relationship possess a
measure of influence over each arbitrator that JAMS provides. In this
sense, an atmosphere of pervasive trust and confidence may well per-
meate the Wells Fargo-JAMS relationship, because JAMS benefits
from every matter submitted to it for arbitration, and the owners of
JAMS have control over employment decisions involving the arbitra-
tors presiding over individual arbitration hearings.
This, too, may stretch the modified Banwait standard too far, be-
cause it imputes the interest of the JAMS shareholders to individual
JAMS arbitrators by virtue of the shareholders' residual influence
over the continued employment of those arbitrators. This attenuated
imputation of interest is a step removed from the employment rela-
tionships of Wheeler and Figi, where financial benefits accrued di-
rectly to the individual arbitrators. Until this institutional relationship
is tested in California courts, however, application of the impression
of possible bias relationship to the Wells Fargo-JAMS arrangement
(and, for that matter, the Bank of America-AAA relationship) is an
open question.
(2) Does the Customer Agreement Provide "Unambiguous Disclosure"?
The next question concerns full disclosure of these institutional
arbitration arrangements. Because the Wells Fargo-JAMS arrange-
157. JAMS provides neutral arbitrators for resolution of Wells Fargo disputes. Under
Neaman, employment as a neutral arbitrator alone does not constitute a relationship that
must be disclosed. This application of Neaman does not mean that the Wells Fargo-JAMS
arrangement is an insubstantial business relationship. The proper inquiry is the relation-
ship between the party and the neutral arbitrator. In this light, the relationship between
Wells Fargo and JAMS as institutions may indeed be substantial.
158. This is by virtue of their right to elect directors who, in turn, have the power to
name managers that make employment decisions.
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ment presents a closer case for the creation of an impression of possi-
ble bias, it is the focus for discussion of this question.
Assuming that the Wells Fargo-JAMS arrangement gives rise to
an impression of possible bias that individual arbitrators must dis-
close, under Neaman each arbitrator must make unambiguous disclo-
sure of JAMS's agreement with Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo's customer
agreement alone probably does not provide unambiguous disclosure.
Although the agreement clearly states that JAMS will resolve all dis-
putes, this "disclosure" cannot be described as unambiguous. Wells
Fargo customers are not likely to pore over the technical customer
agreements that detail the substantial business relationship between
Wells Fargo and JAMS. 159 Without a clear explanation of the arbitra-
tion agreement to the customer, stated in plain English, there can be
no unambiguous disclosure.
It is also debatable whether the customer receives unambiguous
disclosure by virtue of the arbitration proceedings. When disputes are
submitted to JAMS arbitrators for resolution, individual customers
are concerned only with the resolution of their individual claims.
Wells Fargo customers will undoubtedly know that JAMS has pro-
vided the arbitrator presiding over the dispute, but there is no guaran-
tee that they will grasp the full extent of the Wells Fargo-JAMS
arrangement. This is significant, since the full extent of the relation-
ship is what arguably gives rise to an impression of possible bias. A
sophisticated party-one with outside knowledge of the Wells Fargo-
JAMS relationship-or its counsel might not need this disclosure, but
Neaman does not suggest that this substitutes for anything less than
full disclosure to the claimant. "Unambiguous disclosure," by its very
nature, requires an objective standard to protect all claimants, regard-
less of any particular knowledge or status that they might have.
In the face of this uncertainty with regard to disclosure, the valid-
ity of JAMS's arbitration awards in the context of the Wells Fargo
arrangement is questionable. Disclosure affords parties the opportu-
nity to reject the appointment of particular arbitrators maintaining re-
lationships that give rise to an impression of possible bias.160 If the
Wells Fargo-JAMS arrangement itself is what gives rise to an impres-
sion of possible bias, then claimants would be free to reject any JAMS
arbitrator. This, however, clashes with Wells Fargo's contractual pro-
vision mandating the submission of every customer dispute to JAMS
for arbitration. This irreconcilable conflict seemingly compels one of
159. Perhaps providing individual Wells Fargo customers with the actual terms of the
Wells Fargo-JAMS agreement would provide the unambiguous disclosure required under
Neaman. However, like the customer agreements, these are technical documents that
might not unambiguously disclose the true nature of the relationship.
160. The consensual theory of contractual arbitration supports this notion. See supra
note 24 and accompanying text.
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two results. Courts may either disregard the formalities of the impres-
sion of possible bias analysis and honor Wells Fargo's arbitration
clause, 161 or invalidate the clause outright because it essentially denies
claimants their liberty to submit disputes to an arbitrator free from
possible bias.162
Conclusion
Because the impression of possible bias standard is based on fact-
specific cases, assessment of its underlying framework is complicated.
Critical analysis of California case law nevertheless yields criteria that
may be consistently applied. Courts appear reluctant to squarely ad-
dress the nature of the relationship requiring disclosure, yet this pro-
vides the key to proper analysis. Banwait v. Hernandez was the first
attempt to characterize the true nature of this relationship, but its for-
mulation was overinclusive. The Banwait standard is properly limited
by the logic of Johnston and San Luis Obispo Bay Properties. Thus
limited, the question becomes whether a particular relationship is
characterized by an atmosphere of pervasive trust and confidence. If
a relationship may be characterized in this manner, it must be
disclosed.
The impression of possible bias standard raises questions when
applied to arbitration clauses involving large institutional arbitrators.
Part IV addressed clauses presently used by two of the nation's largest
banks, Wells Fargo and Bank of America. Bank of America's provi-
sions seemingly withstand analysis because they mandate the use of a
nonprofit arbitration provider, the AAA. Wells Fargo's provisions,
however, are more problematic. They entail the employment of a pri-
vate arbitration provider, JAMS, that has a financial stake in every
matter submitted to arbitration. Strict application of the impression
of possible bias standard mandates that every award rendered under
this arrangement is subject to vacation. Neither arrangement, how-
ever, has been tested under the impression of possible bias standard in
California courts. Until they are, the validity of both arrangements
remains an open question.
161. The Wells Fargo contractual arbitration provision may provide an alternative if
courts are unwilling to disregard the impression of possible bias analysis. It provides for
the appointment of arbitrators by the AAA if JAMS is unable to provide an arbitrator.
One possible interpretation of this provision is that imputation of the impression of possi-
ble bias to all JAMS arbitrators renders them all unavailable within the meaning of Wells
Fargo's contractual provision. While this may allow the continued arbitration of Wells
Fargo's contractual disputes, JAMS would vigorously oppose such an interpretation, since
it would be denied the business that the provision seemingly provides.
162. However, invalidation of the clause outright would have serious practical conse-
quences as it would ultimately mean the end of contractual arbitration provisions between
large corporate enterprises and profit-seeking institutional arbitration providers.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
November 19931 THE IMPRESSION OF POSSIBLE BIAS
As discussed in Part wV,163 courts have two options when faced
with an institutional arbitration provision that creates a blanket im-
pression of possible bias. They may disregard formal application of
the impression of possible bias analysis and honor the arbitration ar-
rangements, or they may invalidate the clauses outright. Invalidation
of the clauses outright would violate the strong public policy of divert-
ing the resolution of disputes from public (i.e., judicial) to private
fora.164 In light of this, courts may decide to sacrifice logical consis-
tency for the sake of maintaining viable procedures for implementing
this public policy, and to disregard any blanket impression of possible
bias created by virtue of these institutional arbitration arrangements.
Postscript
Just before the issue in which this Note appears went to press,
two decisions involving the impression of possible bias standard took
place. The first was the California Supreme Court's denial of review
of Betz 11.16 5 As that case was correctly decided under the "atmos-
phere of pervasive trust and confidence" standard set forth in this
Note,166 this denial of review is of little practical significance.
The second decision, Kaiser Foundation Hospital v. Superior
Court, 67 may potentially affect the impression of possible bias stan-
dard as applied in California. In Kaiser, the court vacated an arbitra-
tion award where Ralph Drummond, the arbitrator whose presence
on the arbitration panel was at issue in Neaman,168 served as the neu-
tral arbitrator. Because Drummond's relationship with Kaiser created
an impression of possible bias in Neaman, nondisclosure of that rela-
tionship was sufficient to vacate the award in Kaiser.
What is potentially significant about Kaiser, however, is its treat-
ment of Johnston. The court cited Johnston for the proposition that "a
neutral arbitrator's failure to disclose even sporadic business relation-
ships with a party to the arbitration constitutes legal cause for vacating
the award.' 69 Noticeably absent from this interpretation of Johnston
is any reference to the substantiality of the arbitrator's previous busi-
ness relationships. This may have been an oversight, or it may have
163. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Delta Lines, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 136 Cal. Rptr. 345,
348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) ("It has long been the policy of this state to recognize and give the
utmost effect to arbitration agreements.").
165. Betz v. Pankow, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 5091 (Cal. Oct. 5, 1993) (denying review). For a
discussion of Betz II, see supra note 122.
166. See supra note 122.
167. 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
168. See supra notes 129-134.
169. Kaiser, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433 (citing Johnston, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 134).
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been intentional. Whatever the reason for this omission, its practical
impact will be determined by the holdings of future cases.
